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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores maritime protection zones, which are being created in the territorial 
waters of a number of European states. Through the work of Gaston Bachelard and Peter 
Sloterdijk, the paper explores maritime zonation as a paradigmatic global security 
mechanism.  It examines how maritime spatial planning seeks to reconfigure sea space into 
spheres of predictability and rationality. These processes, it proposes, seek to routinize sea 
space and reconcile tensions between the governance of land and sea, and between fixed 
infrastructure and mobile capital flows. The paper concludes that space which emerges from 
a pluralist and less anthropocentric understanding of of the maritime would provide more 
effective security.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This article contributes to our knowledge of spatial security practices. In particular it forms a 
study of maritime spatial security and the geometry of zoning which undergirds it.  As Joyce 
(2003: 41) has pointed out, the security of space refers primarily to territorializing practices 
by which knowledge, competency and agency is engineered into the material world. In the 
maritime sphere it can be examined as an emergent set of processes which seek to classify 
and reorder the political economy of seaspace, and which assigns it a moral, military, 
scientific and commercial value.  
Maritime spatial planning is an intensification of previous efforts to rationalise the use of 
global seaspace which, it will be argued, extend into the maritime a logic that has 
historically informed planning on urbanised space. Nonetheless, contemporary maritime 
planning projects confront novel problems of scale and distance that do not arise with their 
urban counterparts. Moreover we hardly need to be reminded of the ocean’s materiality as a 
fluid, constantly changing environment.  Understood as a site of uncertainty and chaos, as a 
heterotopia and as place of adventure (Cohen 2003), the ocean, unlike the land, is generally 
considered unconquerable (Lehman 2013: 493). ‘Unlike human interactions with terrestrial 
forms of nature’, argues Peters (2012: 1243), ‘society is less able to shape and mould the sea 
to its own desires’. Thus, the establishment of maritime protection zones (MPZ)1 reveals 
much about how innovations in scientific data gathering, in spatial planning methodologies 
                                                            
1 The terms maritime protection areas (MPA) and maritime protection zones (MPZ) are interchangeable but 
the latter term will be mainly used throughout this text.  
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and in monitoring and surveillance technologies have made it possible to imagine a security 
network of vast three dimensional zones regulating maritime space.   
The three dimensionality of maritime planning relates to the way it layers ocean space so 
that multiple uses can be assigned simultaneously to the seabed, the sea column and the sea 
surface. The rationale is that individual economic sectors of the sea are interdependent and 
rely upon common skills and infrastructure. These sectors include coastal tourism, offshore 
oil and gas, deep sea fishing, short sea shipping, yachting and marinas, passenger ferry 
services, cruise tourism, fisheries, inland water transport, coastal protection, offshore wind 
farms, state monitoring and surveillance activities, military training, blue biotechnology, 
desalination, aggregates mining, marine aquatic products, marine mineral mining and ocean 
renewable energies. Three dimensional zoning effectively changes traditional 
understandings of maritime security which imagined the sea in terms of a unidimensional 
plane upon which sea lanes were secured for global circulation. Moreover three dimensional 
zoning has also been instrumental in changing long held geopolitical constructions which 
tendered sovereignty merely in terms of land-based territory. Territory for littoral states at 
least, as we shall see, increasingly refers to the de facto sovereignty which covers the seabed, 
the sea column the sea surface and the airspace above a state’s exclusive economic zone.  
Steinberg’s (2009) historical survey of mapmaking has found that any distinction between 
terrestrial and maritime environments derives from the social significance historically 
assigned to ocean space.  He points out, for instance, that at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, European cartographers did not distinguish between land and sea, insinuating that 
‘the ocean, like land, was filled with social processes and natural features, and that therefore, 
like land, it could be bounded, controlled, and organized’. (Steinberg 2009:482).  
Acknowledging a Grotian outlook more conducive to the growth of seigniorial state 
capitalism (and colonialism), mapmakers from the seventeenth century constructed sea 
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space in terms of routes, as a sphere of navigation, where land and sea were separate entities 
(Benton 2006). As Brilmayer and Klein (2001:703) have observed, it is for this reason that 
today ‘the international legal regimes for allocation of sovereign rights to land and water 
areas are fundamentally different.   
This article thus marks a shift from scholarship on sea governance or maritime security, 
which focuses on the novel forms of political structure emerging around the global maritime 
economy (Bueger and Stockbruegger 2013). Phenomena such as piracy, migration and 
terrorism form the empirical basis of much of the literature in this field. Following Braudel 
(1972: 276), who described the Mediterranean in terms of, ‘the movements of men, the 
relationships they imply, and the routes they follow’, this literature conceives the sea as a 
plane of mobility, constituted in terms of risks that threaten its sea lanes (c.f. Struett, Carlson 
and Nance 2013). The following article supplements this literature by tracing emergent 
security practices which arise when the sea becomes subject to maritime planning and is no 
longer simply configured as the sum of its human routes. Normative and technical studies 
published in the fields of maritime policy, geography and environmental science 
demonstrate an increasing awareness of the effect maritime zoning is having on the way the 
sea is experienced (c.f. Joas, Jahn and Kern 2008; Douvere 2008; Monmonier 2010; Suárez Del 
Vivero et al 2009). Bear and Eden (2008) have critiqued the rigidity of zoning practices that 
arise from the issuance of fishing licences in the UK.  Zoning rationalities have been 
incorporated in Lobo-Guerrero’s (2012) study of strategized space and in Deborah Cowen’s 
(2015) work on the exceptionality and militarization of of port security. Similarly, in an 
historically informed account, Lauren Benton (2010) has analysed colonial space in terms of 
zones and routes; as a set of legal corridors and enclaves. The multi-dimensional nature of 
zonation thus challenges us to revisit Braudel’s (1972) route-based imaginary of the ocean. In 
fact, contemporary maritime security aims to routinize the use of the sea in a manner that 
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supports Elden’s (2009; 2013: 49) argument that dimensions of depth and height are integral 
to the security of space, and that circulation is therefore not ‘contained, controlled and 
regulated, on a plane’.    
The article explores multi-dimensional zoning initially through Gaston Bachelard’s ‘The 
Poetics of Space’; a meditation on the relationship between place and metaphysical security. 
Bachelard’s phenomenology places into historical perspective tensions that arise from 
attempts to secure complex environments of hypermobility. The article traces these tensions 
and outlines the Apollonian rationality behind efforts to construct routine and continuity by 
protecting and demarcating a predictable and stable interior from a dangerous outside. By 
being able to claim a capacity to regulate competing interests and claims on space, maritime 
governance boasts inclusivity, a scientific rationale and an environmental imperative.  
In order to explore these claims the article turns to the recent work by Peter Sloterdijk into 
the phenomenology of security and spatial spheres. Although influenced by him, Sloterdijk 
has pushed Bachelard’s provincial Dionysian materialism to conceptualise security practices 
operating in the fluid, dynamic, and rootless globalized spaces of the twenty-first century. 
Sloterdijk (2013a: 89) has critiqued a blindness towards the sea evident in the writings of 
Kant and other continental philosophers (including Heidegger) for remaining tied to ‘the 
perspectives of deep-rooted, terran-regional self assertion’.  Intensely curious about the 
‘maritime action space’,  Sloterdijk’s work presents modernity as a space of artificial security 
constructions that are metaphorical spheres; three-dimensional, self-immunizing enclosures 
afloat in volatile and unpredictable materiality. Multi-functional zoning at sea conforms 
closely to the topology of spheres critiqued by Sloterdijk, who describes globalization 
shaping space through new procedures that create ‘synchronous world routines’ (Sloterdijk 
2012: 172). The paper is thus able to propose that zoning and routinization is an exemplar 
globalization strategy that seeks to gentrify rural and wilderness sea spaces (Hellström 2007: 
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423). From a security perspective, it demonstrates the freedom of the sea gradually being 
refashioned to reflect the hierarchy of values and differentiated rights of access that defines 
our urban landscapes and critical infrastructures (Graham 2010). 
 
ZONAL SECURITY AND THE SEA 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, the classical freedom of the high seas, so pivotal to liberal 
political economy and to the security of seigniorial maritime powers for three hundred years 
was subject to a process of strategic modulation.  Shipping lane security, which historically 
structured our understanding of sea as ‘as an empty void to be annihilated by hypermobile 
capital’, is currently being disrupted and supplemented by a  construction that frames the 
sea not as a void but as a ‘resource-rich but fragile space requiring rational management for 
sustainable development’ (Steinberg 1999c: 403). The well-being of the sea and the destiny of 
globalization have been intertwined in this narrative. With the emergence of zoning, the 
two-dimensional lines demarcating the swiftest and safest routes no longer move things and 
people through empty blue space: they now pass through three-dimensional, multi-
functional security zones. By cordoning off space for discrete functions, zones add value to 
specific sites, and therefore increasingly carry a territorial and managerial rationality to the 
formerly apolitical, route-based logic of ocean movement (Ryan 2013).   
It is possible to trace zoning back to early modernity when ocean space was first named and 
a thus appropriated by colonial maritime powers. Carl Schmitt (2006) has traced global two-
dimensional linear zoning to amity lines drawn in the late fifteenth century by Pope 
Alexander VI. Zoning practices have however accelerated in the twentieth century and are 
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most immediately detectable in the complex spatial system of fishery management, 
ecological, hydrographic and statistical-oceanographic categories that are rudimentarily 
managing world sea space. In addition to subdivisions of oceans and seas carried out by the 
International Hydrographic Office since 1928, vast macro-zones have been carved out by the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), which has identified sixty-four large 
marine ecosytems in world ocean space. Within and around the 200,000km of UNEP 
protectorates are eighty-eight major fishery zones delineated by the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO). Supplementing this complex matrix are forty-six UNESCO marine 
heritage sites (Douvere 2008).  As Suárez-de- Vivero et al (2009:628) have pointed out; one 
can locate thirteen European partitions alone dividing up the waters of the North East 
Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. Sub-divisible into more or less 
governable, or commodifiable units, amongst these macro abstract demarcations of sea 
space lie exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and fishery zones, which attained a jurisdictional 
status through customary and international law over the past century.  
It should be noted that even under the liberal Grotian regime that persisted for 300 years, 
states possessed sovereign rights over their internal waters and their territorial seas and 
beyond that limited jurisdiction over a contiguous zone for security purposes.2  Following a 
claim in the early 19th century by France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Russia 
and the United States claimed jurisdiction within 20 kms of their territorial sea to enable the 
enforcement of ‘customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations’ (Colombos 1967: 145-
146). Nonetheless, the origins of land-based governance segueing into a system of high sea 
governance might be traced back to the ‘patrimonial’ claims initiated by Colombia in 1919, 
when it claimed an exclusive right to exploit hydrocarbons beneath the territorial sea. While 
                                                            
2 There are seven categories of maritime space through which sovereign rights and duties adhere. 
Internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, continental shelves, EEZs and 
fishery zones.  
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this move was followed by Panama, Venezuela and Argentina -  all of who sought to protect 
fisheries and mineral reserves - it was not until the end of World War Two that we can 
properly point to the first moves to territorialize the high seas. In the Truman Declaration, 
September 1945, the US laid claim to jurisdictional authority over its continental shelf and 
fisheries resources. Historically this marks a departure from Britain’s dominance over ocean 
space and the birth of the US as a global naval power. While carefully preserving the 
strategically vital principle of freedom on the high seas, the US declaration demonstrated the 
economic possibility afforded by technological advances of claims over sea space (Krueger 
and Nordquist 1978). As Nye (1975:33) has observed, states that were less developed, and 
less likely to profit from what China called the ‘hegemony and expansionism’ inherent in 
high seas freedom, reacted to the US declaration with their own protectionist sovereign 
claims. Between 1974 and 1982, in the face of resistance from the United States, Latin 
American and African states were pushing the norm of 12 nautical miles (territorial sea) 
towards a 200 nautical mile EEZ at the negotiations around UNCLOS III. Article 55 of 
Convention that emerged from these negotiations in 1976 codified the EEZ at this distance, 
granting states sovereign rights for the ‘exploration, exploitation, conservation and 
management of all natural resources and other economic activities’ (Krueger and Nordquist 
1978: 329). Enshrining mobile rights within an emerging zoning regime, associated rights 
and duties of states included the right of navigation and overflight, and the right to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines.3 Thus, while the jurisdictions of states such as France, the 
United States and Australia were significantly increased by the Law of the Sea Convention, 
the legislation simultaneously guaranteed seigniorial maritime powers unimpeded rights of 
mobility around a three-dimensional global sea space. The Convention therefore sought to 
                                                            
3 Thirty four countries enjoy sovereign rights beyond the 200 nautical mile limit; where the 
continental shelf extends beyond a coastal state’s EEZ, it is entitled to jurisdiction over the seabed and 
subsoil up to 350 nautical miles. 
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secure a sort of juxtaposition; facilitating the cohabitation of fixed, long term infrastructures 
with free flowing capital.  
By 2013 it was estimated that 58.4% of the world seas and oceans had come under national 
control (Súarez-de-Vivero 2013: 117).   Undoubtedly, EEZs have given rise to new practices 
of national security, evidential in the rising number of national maritime security strategies 
being published. However, of concern to this study is the dramatic reconfiguration of sea 
space occurring within these ‘nationalised’ exclusive zones.   
Zoning is profitably understood as a taxonomical process:  as technological capability 
increases and scientific knowledge of the ocean expands, the global maritime is being 
systematically sub-divided into ever smaller administrative units (Ryan 2013: 177).  While 
these developments were still at a rudimentary stage, Schmitt (2006) had identified the 
impulse to draw lines and divide ocean space as the ‘new nomos of the earth’.  What is 
increasingly evident is that this new nomos refers to the territorialisation of sea space; a new 
arrangement or redistribution of political and economic power that creates new meaning in 
social space (Brown and Lunt 2002).  Thus, the phenomenon at issue concerns a 
territorialization of sea space that, it will be shown, emerges through a security architecture 
that operates in cities, in rural areas and in airspace (Williams 2011). Understanding 
maritime spatial planning as the strategic parceling up of open space enables us to locate a 
constant tension on the sea between what Deleuze and Guattari (2008) termed smooth and 
striated space. Striated space, as Osborne and Rose (2004:218) point out, is fixed space that 
‘bounds structures, frames and locates action; and practices of discipline, regulation, 
subjection take place inside these spaces’. Striated space interacts with smooth space, which 
is ungoverned, nomadic, barbaric and continually challenged by the state’s will to striate 
(Hillier 2007:64). Materialist ontologies of security enables us to better comprehend how 
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zones mediate between between a rooted, terrestrially-derived (striated) mode of 
governance and a (nomadic) smooth space perspective more conducive to capital flows.   
Prior to exploring the empirical development of maritime spatial planning, the next section 
will present a phenomenological account of socio-spatial security practices. It will outline 
the rationality of routinization at work within efforts to construct blue economies. The paper 
will argue that while maritime zoning is dissolving traditional distinctions, such as that 
between land and sea, it is simultaneously drawing new exclusionary lines. Prior to making 
this argument it is imperative we understand the ontology of security at work in the 
techniques used to govern complex fluid spaces.  
 
Securing Late Modern Space 
In the late 1950’s Gaston Bachelard’s ‘The Poetics of Space’ produced a phenomenological 
account of how local space generates metaphysical security. For Bachelard (1994) security 
emanated from the vital materiality of an object. His abiding image of a home is a rural place 
where memories and dreams are rooted and consciousness is centralized. Bachelard 
introduces the idea of verticality to his conception of security by associating the garret with 
memory and roots, the ground floor with everyday reality and the attic with imaginative 
becoming. Home is where well-being is housed and security is imagined as an organic 
refuge that is at once relational with its environment and yet protective. Bachelard (1994:27) 
contrasts this metaphysically porous home with ‘mechanical’ modern urban habitation; 
‘where houses are no longer aware of the storms of the outside universe’, and where ‘the 
relationship between house and space becomes an artificial one’. Life in Paris incites 
Bachelard to ask how one can feel secure in an urban space. In response he invokes a 
comparison between the noise of the city and the roar of the ocean: ‘we all know that the big 
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city is a clamorous sea’ he writes, imagining the noise of traffic to be waves and wind and 
his bed as a skiff (1994: 28). As we shall see, this analogy between the city and the dynamism 
of the sea endures in current processes of maritime security.  
Bachelard’s mid-twentieth century attachment to the local finds resonance in an 
anthropological study undertaken by Tuan (1977). Tuan observed that for the ancient 
cultures in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin secured space had a mystical 
foundation. In early Mesopotamian towns, writes Tuan, ‘when life seemed uncertain and 
nature hostile, the divinities not only promoted life and protected it, they were also the 
guarantors of order in nature and society’ (1977:150). Yet one has to only look at ancient 
Greece to appreciate the extent to which this strategy of good order came into tension with 
the disorderly nature of the sea upon which Athenian thalassocracy depended. This tension 
is a major political theme in the works of Plato and Aristotle. In these writings the sea 
becomes symbolic of the destablizing democratic demands of those living and working in 
the port of Piraeus (Hale 2014). The sea was therefore constructed as somewhere diseased, 
lustful, drunken and lost (Rancière 2007). It embodied the chaotic, intoxicating and fatal 
divinity of Dionysus. Dionysus was a sailor, a foreigner that had come from the sea and the 
antithesis to Apollo, the divinity of Platonic form, symmetry and good spatial order 
(Akkerman 2006: 237).  
While the link between localism and divinity was transformed in the wake of the 
Copernican secular revolution, the essential values of order - rationality and moderation -
remained (Fletcher 2009). Apollonian values expressing security as a function of calmness 
and predictability remained extant as their ancient roots became unmoored by a new and 
liberal formation of spatial security that wrestled with generating circulation in an age of 
openness, flows and movement (Joyce 2003). Indeed, the early-twentieth century urban 
planner Hans Blumenfeld (1949) observed that the principle of axiality has entirely 
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dominated urban planning since the Renaissance by foregrounding routes as the producers 
of space through cities. By emphasising the city’s grandeur, he notes, streets have served to 
express the political unity and majesty of the state (Blumenfeld 1949:26). Routes, in other 
words, established the new ‘ground’ upon which political and economic power was 
redistributed (Virilio 1986:12).  The foundation of this nomos is no longer solid, firm ground 
upon which we stand; it is an ever-shifting and fluid surface upon which we float (Anderson 
2012).The ontological utility provided by roots had somehow to be transplanted onto the 
new and highly insecure nomos of movement and flow to govern a society open to the forces 
of capital. The ontological ‘problem’ of reconciling these apparently antithetical properties 
has been one that undergirds the modern security dilemma.  
The study of maintaining ontological security in an insecure modern environment received a 
lot of attention from Anthony Giddens during the 1990’s. Giddens’ work was influenced by 
R.D. Laing’s understanding that security was a psychological phenomenon rooted in one’s 
self being unified, useful and rational (Laing 1990:39) . Affirming a border between 
ontologies of internal and external security, and drawing again upon Laing (1990a), Giddens 
(1991), posited home as the private zone which nurtures and protects a sense of being secure 
in the face of a public sphere where security is based on constant surveillance. For Giddens, 
ontological security is the state of possessing ‘answers to fundamental existential questions’ 
… and ‘reproducing these answers in the form of actions that take on the appearance or 
shape of a routine’ (Steele 2005:526). His motivation is to create a form of security based on 
continuity over space and time in trusting, predictable relations between actors that will 
protect the individual from ‘existential anxiety’. In other words, Giddens is linking 
ontological security with calmness and with a unity of meaning and home; and insecurity 
with external uncertainty and fragmentation (Dupuis and Thoms 1998). When his 
foundational ontology is raised up to the level of state security we can see more clearly the 
13 
 
Apollonian legacy. In the work of Jennifer Mitzen (2006), Giddens’ ontological security is 
reworked for state security. Unsurprisingly, she emphasises the predictability of routines. 
She notes that routines produce certainty, enables ‘purposive choice’ and inoculates 
individuals from the ‘paralytic, deep fear of chaos’:  
routines are not chosen in any meaningful sense, but taken-for-granted; 
reflection is suppressed. In fact this suppression is the source of their security-
generating power  
(Mitzen 2006; 346-347) 
 
Such routinization, it has been observed, has been used to distract from our primordial fear 
of the sea. A paper by Antonnucci (2006) recounts how with the launch in 1843 of metal 
constructed vessels, ships became a larger, ever more luxurious form of transport better able 
to tranquillize its passengers. The introduction of brightness to the dark recesses of old 
galleys enabled ships to provide comfort for passengers. The relation between the sea and 
the passenger became secured in the routinzation of sea-crossings amidst bourgeois interiors 
that were designed to remind one of home and replicate the most spectacular architectures 
of the state apparatus. Again we are reminded of Apollo, this time as the god of light. Here 
we see his brightness produce the calm that is required to dispel the fear of the externalized 
sea. The passenger at sea is secured by replicating the attributes of a well policed city - the 
hold is made to feel as firm as a city, immunized against the elemental flux outside. As 
Easterling (2005:23) has so eloquently demonstrated, contemporary ocean liner cruising’ 
replicates an ‘enclosure of familiarity’.4 
Easterling’s purposeful use of the word ‘enclosure’ relates to how she treats cruise liners as 
cages of comprehension, or umwelt, for Heidegger (Sutrop 2001). Literally the ‘world-
                                                            
4 Emphasis added.  
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around-us’, umwelt describes technical or political enclosures that mark a limit between 
what we understand and the world around us (Ten Bos 2008). As do the wealthy cruise liner 
passengers in Easterling’s analysis, the inhabitants of these enclosures can travel anywhere 
and remain oblivious to the fact that their security is housed by vulnerable social 
constructions of reality.5  Peter Sloterdijk’s (2011) work has done much to conceptualise 
these enclosures and the ontological security they aim to replicate in his major work on 
spheres. In fact, Sloterdijk’s philosophy provides us with remarkable insight into the  
rationale behind zoning.  
 
Sloterdijk’s Spheres  
From this conceptualization of umwelt, the metaphor of the circle has emerged as a means to 
articulate the ontological geometry of our surrounding (in)security. As Bachelard notes; 
‘thus, in being, everything is circuitous, roundabout, recurrent’ (1994:214).  Or later, ‘das 
Dasein ist rund. Being is round’ (1994: 239).  Much of Peter Sloterdijk’s work can be read as a 
response and an elaboration of Bachelard’s phenomenology of security and space. As with 
Bachelard, Sloterdijk’s metaphysical being takes the form of roundness in his major work on 
spheres (2011). The sphere is therefore a human made ontological construction for Sloterdijk 
and a form from which he interrogates the possibility of security in a decentralized, fluid 
and contested global environment. Sloterdijk argues from a Heideggerean position that 
modern security practices reproduce ‘prosthetic husks’ (2011: 24), human spheres which are 
ultimately as vulnerable to material forces as soap bubbles blown by a child into the air.  
Sloterdijk’s philosophy of space is thus inherently liquid and it tells us something about the 
                                                            
5 As Dillon (1996; 125) reminds us, the etymology of the Latin securitas can be traced to the phrase sine cura, 
to be free from care. It was also used to describe a thing that possesses a false sense of certitude, a groundless 
sense of security. 
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morphology of maritime planning. As three-dimensional, multi-functional,  enclosures of 
space, the architecture of maritime zones resonates with the qualities of Sloterdijk’s 
‘bubbles’.  
For Sloterdijk, by generating freedom at the expense of metaphysical security, our epoch is 
defined by its will to uproot traditional experiential and cultural forms of local security. 
Substituting place-specific gods, myths and culture for science, universalised rationality and 
individualism, globalization decrees that ‘enormous populations, at the center as well as at 
the margins, must be evacuated from the old cosy temperate regional illusion and exposed 
to the frosts of freedom’ (2011: 27).  The consequent sense of exposure compels us to huddle 
in what Klauser (2010: 329) describes as, ‘self-animated spaces of togetherness’. The 
symbolic spheres Sloterdijk finds throughout modernity’s cultural history serve as artificial 
replicas to ancient roots. They are globular in shape, moulded in the image of the very 
obsolete cosmological and theological narratives that once shielded ancient civilizations 
within ‘celestial domes’ (Sloterdijk 2011: 25; 2009). Thus modernity is defined by its desire to 
respond to the very question that Bachelard posed from his apartment in Paris; how to 
reconstruct metaphysical security in the face of a rootless and dynamic formation of political 
and economic freedom that rips well-being from its ontological source?  
An ensemble of heterogeneous bubbles coagulating to form an ungovernable ‘foam’, his 
philosophy of space describes routinized enclosures floating together in the midst of a 
hostile externality. Klauser (2010; 332) cites Sloterdijk’s observation that, ‘for this organism 
the biggest part of the environment is either toxic or meaningless’. It is beyond the limits of 
its understanding. The tendency of the exposed human is to seek a safe zone: 
 
16 
 
Humans are self-fencing, self-shepherding creatures. Wherever they live, they 
create parks around themselves. In city parks, national parks, provincial or state 
parks, eco-parks – everywhere people must create from themselves rules 
according to which their comportment is to be governed  
(Sloterdijk 2009:25) 
 
Inhabiting these security bubbles are humans who have lost touch with what really 
surrounds them, the material world (Sloterdijk 2013).  Attempts to purify space, their 
spheres are sterilized zones of socially constructed security. Referring to them in terms of 
being immunized (atmo)spheres, his ensembles of security are occupied by the self-
quarantined. Zygmunt Bauman, has drawn similar conclusions in work that examines the 
insides of security communities, describing a a ‘self-enclosed place without a place’ where 
‘the differences inside, unlike the differences outside, are tamed, sanitized’ (Bauman 2000; 
99). A global way of life can be safely conserved in the hotels, shopping malls, airports, and 
cruise ships which exhibit themselves as purified placeless spaces.  
What distinguishes Sloterdijk’s topolphilia from previous ontologies such as Bachelard’s, 
according to Ten Bos, is that it is situated in the flux of ocean, rather than the firmness of 
land.  ‘Being is understood as “being surrounded” and “being flowed through” especially as 
being together in a watery element’. (Ten Bos 2008:78).  Sloterdijk is fascinated by the human 
impulse to construct islands. Here it is worth citing Ten Bos at length:  
 
Nowadays, we use different technologies: we construct absolute islands aiming 
at a complete isolation from the surrounding environment (aircraft, spacecraft, 
and so on); we construct atmospheric islands that aim to control temperature 
and climate (greenhouses, air-conditioned offices, and so on); we also construct 
`anthropogenic' islands which are supposed to carry people and keep them 
together. Sloterdijk devotes hundreds of pages to such islands that allow us to 
become the human beings we are: organisations, companies, sports clubs, sects, 
families, neighbourhoods, countries, empires, states, temples 
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(Ten Bos 2008: 81) 
 
Maritime protection zones ought to be understood as areas abruptly cordoned off from the 
Dionysian frenzy of the sea. They are enclosures of Apollonian rationality that aim to anchor 
a sense of control and predictability to a volatile environment. By routinizing activity within 
the enclave, maritime planning embodies the exclusivity of free trade zones and other 
economic zones that structure the politics of mobility on land (Cresswell 2010), which is 
constituted by ‘more or less purified insides and more or less dangerous outsides’ (Klauser 
2010:332).  As we shall see, it is this exclusionary impulse that undergirds contemporary 
attempts to striate the maritime zone 
 
THE MARITIME PROTECTION ZONE (MPZ) 
 
Sloterdijk’s phenomenology of the sphere enables us to discern core aspects of late modern 
security practices that are embodied in maritime spatial planning.  Certainly there is a 
spherical ontology at work in these new sub-categories of marine space. The jurisdictional 
limits wherein planning occurs are designated from a baseline by ‘drawing overlapping 
circles centered along the low water shoreline’ (Monmonier 2010:71). The geographer Mark 
Monmonier (2008: 104) explains; ‘In theory a maritime territory or [exclusive economic] zone 
is defined by a multitude of overlapping circles, twelve to two hundred miles in radius, 
centered at every point along the shoreline’.   
Within these exclusive economic zones, maritime spatial planning identifies spheres where, 
for commercial, environmental or military purposes, human activity will be regulated. Thus 
18 
 
it is not the materiality of the sea that is being secured, but the relationships between various 
actors who use the sea. In Sloterdijk’s terminology, zoning reconfigures the sea by uprooting 
traditional relationships between the sea and its users and initiates new procedures and 
routines. By striating sea space, maritime planning embeds a hierarchy of values which 
illustrates that zoning is a form of protection that serves particular ways of life, while 
affecting the potentiality of other forms of life to survive.  
Indicatively, the goals of maritime planning are to ‘describe, visualize and realize rights, 
restrictions and responsibilities in the marine environment’ (Strain, Rajabifard and 
Williamson 2006 :434). Emerging as a legal possibility from UNCLOS III, a number of global 
frameworks have been generated around these goals. Agenda 21 for instance, in 1992, 
established the norm of sustainable development of marine environments and its resources. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity, held in 2004, included frameworks for ecosystem 
place-based management using ‘an integrated network of marine and coastal protected 
areas’. The World Summit on Sustainable Development, in 2002, promoted the use of land 
use planning tools for marine spatial planning (Douvere 2009). The originary marine 
protected zone is considered to be the regime placed around Australia’s Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park, finalized in 1994. Since then legislation has passed in Canada in 1997 (Oceans 
Act) which created a national oceans strategy to manage the country’s estuarine, coastal and 
marine ecosystems. The United States has been active in this regard with 25 zones having 
been specified on the Florida Keys National marine Sanctuary Management Plan (Douvere 
2008:767), while China passed its Law on the Management of Sea Uses on 27th October 2001 
which divides its EEZ into different types of functional zones.  
The European Union launched its spatial maritime policy in 2007 based on its understanding 
that seaspace planning could regulate the competition for space in European waters (Meiner 
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2010; Schäfer and Barale 2011).6 The policy is driven by an economic agenda that describes 
spatial planning as a management tool which will increase investment certainty, coordinate 
the implementation of offshore energy, frame national decisions within an ecosystem 
(transborder) manner and ensure consistency between land and marine systems. Europe’s 
‘Blue Economy’ is premised on the claim that marine knowledge, maritime spatial planning 
and maritime surveillance are integrated means which will ‘reduce administrative and 
operational costs for businesses and increase certainty on appropriate access to maritime 
space, thus favouring private investment’ and increase the effectiveness and cost-efficiency 
of about 400 public authorities’( EC 2013:1) . Marine energies (offshore wind power and 
emerging techniques), aquaculture, tourism, biotechnology and marine mineral resources 
have been identified by the EU Commission as its five strategic economic priorities.7 The 
emphasis is on extending Spatial Data Infrastructures developed on the terrestrial 
environment into the maritime arena. In July 2014, the CISE – Common Information Sharing 
Environment – was launched in the EU to bring ‘together surveillance data from civil and 
military authorities like coast guards, navies, traffic monitoring, environmental and 
pollution monitoring, fisheries and border control’.8  
Related to the political problem of data sharing is the related problem of reconciling the land 
based administrative logic of planning with the more dynamic and fluid approach required 
to manage the smoothness of the sea. This is being tackled by not only introducing land-
based municipal or regional zoning to the sea, but by integrating sea space into 
comprehensive land planning. Hence the sea is divided into specific use areas that mirrors 
                                                            
6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0791:FIN:EN:PDF    accessed 
24th April 2013.  
7 http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/blue_growth/documents/com_2012_494_en.pdf  
accessed 24th April 2013.  
8 EU Press Release Maritime surveillance: Joining forces with Member States for safer seas and oceans 
European Commission - IP/14/782   08/07/2014. Accessed 21/07/14 on  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-782_en.htm  
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and extends zoning practices on land – ‘ship channels, disposal areas, military security 
zones, concession zones for mineral extraction, aquaculture sites and most recently marine 
protected zones’ (Douvere 2008: 762; Sanchiro, Eagle et al 2010). By regulating human 
activity in the sea, UNESCO literature envisages the management approach usurping the 
more traditional politics of the sea (Ehler and Douvere 2007) by; 
Analyzing and allocating parts of the three-dimensional marine spaces to 
specific uses, to achieve ecological, economic and social objectives that are 
usually specified through the political process.  
 
The Netherlands, France, Norway, Germany, Spain, Portugal, the UK and Poland, amongst 
others have initiated maritime zoning projects around Europe (Suárez de Vivero and Mateos 
2012; Douvere and Ehler 2009). Germany extended its terrestrial spatial planning legislation 
to cover it’s EEZ in 2004, stretching existing land planning to its coastal area and into the sea. 
Britain, due to its historical role as the harbinger of free high seas had been slow to proclaim 
an EEZ and did so in March 2014 it seems, to facilitate maritime spatial planning.9 The 
British policy concretely binds marine and land planning so that the ‘marine area will 
overlap with that of terrestrial plans … and will not be restricted by an artificial boundary at 
the coast’ (HM Government 2011: 9). There is a more ardent environmental aura in UK plans 
but, as with European level blueprints, socio-economic and national defence priorities are 
given priority over ecological arguments (Wakefield 2010). A national agency, the Maritime 
Management Organisation (MMO) was instituted to ‘co-ordinate an enforcement 
programme for monitoring, control and surveillance of all sea fishing activity’.10 Intimately 
tied up with a newly produced National Maritime Security Strategy, published in May 2014, 
                                                            
9 It should  be noted that the UK in the British Indian Ocean Territory declared an MPZ in 2010 around the 
Chagos Archipelago. It is twice the size of the UK and is currently the world’s largest nature reserve. Critics 
have pointed out that the unilateral establishment of this ‘non‐fishing zone’ effectively prevents the return of 
its indigenous population, deported in 1968‐1973 to facilitate the construction of the strategic US naval and 
airbase in Diego Garcia (Sand 2012).   
10 http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/fisheries/monitoring/index.htm 
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eleven offshore and inshore marine plan areas have been identified by British authorities. 
Aiming to have completed maritime planning by 2034:  
 
The approach enables sustainable commercial fishing, shipping, aquaculture, 
aggregate extraction and other activities to grow, while allowing the 
development of new business opportunities, ensuring safety at sea and 
protecting the environment. Essential infrastructure for the onward 
transportation of goods or energy is in place along the coast  
(HM Government 2014: 4)  
 
Neo-liberal commentators, who refer back to the rationality of the negotiations and the 
environmental benefits accruing from EEZs, argue that MPZs are based on the economics of 
efficient resource allocation and consensus (Young 1982, 2009; Hallwood 2008). This line of 
arguments flows around debates concerning the benefits of enclosure versus commons and 
eventually provides evidence for commentators seeking to privatize maritime space 
(Hannesson 2006: Osherenko 2006).  Thus, primarily an MPZ is presented as a technical 
solution to the problem of reconciling new fixed infrastructures with older and mobile 
‘activities’ on the sea (Oxman 2006). Maes (2008:797), for instance, observes a growing 
tendency for fixed investments such as ‘wind and wave energy, cables and pipelines, coastal 
defence, port infrastructure, aquaculture and land extension’ to be vying for space in the sea 
with older mobile activities such as ‘fisheries, shipping, air transport, military use, water 
recreation’ etc. As Smith, Maes et al ( 2011) insinuate, static interests are generally more 
concerned with the use of the seabed, while mobile uses, including pelagic fish and shipping 
routes, utilize the water column and sea surface. Maritime spatial planning layers ocean 
space so that multiple functions can be assigned simultaneously to the seabed, the column 
and the surface area.  
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Belgium’s is one of the most complete zoning projects and its effect on the use of the North 
Sea is regularly cited by maritime policy experts. Belgium presents an interesting case to 
exemplify the approach to interpreting sea space. As Douvere et al (2007:189) observe, ‘A 
crucial step in the creation of an overall structural map for future MSP in Belgium was to 
generate different strategic visions’. Based upon the three core values – well-being, ecology 
and landscape, and economic value – scenarios were imagined until a vision of the Belgium 
EEZ emerged as: 
i. the relaxed sea, focusing on well-being 
ii. the natural sea, focusing on ecology and landscape; 
iii. the rich sea, focusing on economy; 
iv. the playful sea, focusing on both well-being, and ecology and landscape 
v. the mobile sea, focusing on both ecology and landscape, and economy, 
and 
vi. the sailing sea, focusing on both economy and well-being.11 
(Douvere et al 2007;189) 
Belgium’s maritime spatial plan was presented as a management device to regulate a space 
that was seen to be too anarchic, with too many conflicting users of too few resources. 
Having gathered geological, biological and ecological data, homogeneous zones were 
located and demarcated. Legal, technical and socio-economic surveys were subsequently 
done on each provisional zone to measure the effect of it being delineated for a certain use.  
In contrast to the Belgian schematic, when the Dutch instituted processes for the 
stratification of its sovereign waters, weightings were assigned to zonal valuations. This 
meant that a hierarchy was established amongst the various visions of the sea offered. 
Leading commentators were supportive of this approach, arguing that the hierarchy of 
values needed to be standardized, globalized even: ‘National plans’, argues one leading 
expert, ‘should be translated into international policy in which sea uses should be planned 
                                                            
11 Though not included in the above constructions, the military sea is incorporated into the zones which were 
drawn up around these six constructions. 
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to complement one another on an international scale’ (Douvere 2007:191; Ardon,et al 2008). 
Commentators have lamented the ‘paucity of MPAs in the High Seas’ (Agardy, di Scarra 
and Christie 2011; Kirk 1999). They point out that the technology surrounding Vessel 
Monitoring Systems ‘allow surveillance today at levels not possible a decade ago’ (Agardy, 
di Scarra and Christie 2011;231). The affordability and coverage of this technology, it is 
argued, opens the possibility for global maritime spatial planning by linking protected zones 
in the EEZ’s to areas in the high seas. This proposition chimes with studies that point out a 
need for transnational governance of the maritime environment (Joas, Jahn and Kern 2008). 
When Smith Maes et al (2011) visualize the global maritime in terms of its proximity to 
terrestrial governance structures, they point out that zoned waters are effectively urbanized 
seas. This urbanizing impulse is very evident in the functional visions attributed to the sea 
in the British, Belgian and Dutch plans. Actual cities and towns are zoned by similar visions 
of order. As Osborne and Rose (1999) pointed out, the late modern city of advanced 
liberalism is a healthy city – a city of well-being. It is imagined as a risky city – a city 
monitored and continually assessed; it is a city of enterprise – ‘a node within pathways of 
mobility, a matrix of flows … which connect persons, processes and things; (Osborne and 
Rose 1999:757).  The globalizing impulse implies extending these urban sea blueprints 
outwards into what Maes, Smith et al (2011) term the rural and wilderness seas.  
Steinburg (1999) has argued that the prevailing ocean imagery that drives the values of 
maritime spatial planning needs to be overcome. What he terms the ‘maritime mystique’ 
evident in the Belgian case occludes the voices of those who those who earn their living from 
the sea. ‘Seafarers, dockworkers and artisanal fishing communities’ among others are being 
‘managed out of existence by the regulatory strategies with which each image is aligned’. 
Notwithstanding a commitment to participation and stakeholder inclusion, which features 
in the policy literature, a study conducted by St. Martin and Hall-Aber (2008) has observed 
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how geo-technologies are eclipsing the ‘human dimension’ to reforming the use of sea. GIS 
(Global Information Systems) is the primary MSP technology, used to provide the 
foundational data and produce the analyses and visualization of the space to be regulated. 
‘Neither the complexity of human communities nor their relationship to locations and 
resources at-sea are represented in the current data collection initiatives’, they observe (St. 
Martin and Hall-Aber 2008:779).  
There is some evidence therefore to suggest that the same relatively rigid top-down 
classifications of urban space based on morality, hygiene and order which marked planning 
in the 20th century is extant in maritime planning. Recalling ‘the postwar rush to turn 
planning into an applied science’ it has been observed that much was ignored – ‘the city of 
memory, of desire, of spirit; the importance of place and the art of place-making; the local 
knowledges written into the stones and memories of communities’ (Sandercock 2003;2 cited 
by Tewdwr-Jones and Morphet 2010;243).   
Sloterdijk’s spheres help us to conceptualize this tension emanating from the exclusivity of 
zones: one emanating from communities whose relationship to the sea, and whose 
ontological security, has been uprooted by the sudden presence of maritime spatial 
planning. Dionysian materialists, as we see, point out that security emanates from one’s 
rooted relationship to place. Regarding the scientific-technical discourse around which 
maritime security is developing, one seasoned commentator has observed that ‘scientific 
distancing and objectification has to be complimented with tacit knowledge about socio-
cultural settings’ (Haila 2008). Particularly with maritime political economy this would 
imply that zoning needs to be a ‘more open, multiple and relational activity that can adjust 
to the fluidity of politics’ (Twedwr-Jones and Morphet 2010: 243).  The nature of Sloterdijk’s 
spheres incites us to ask if commercial, environmental, scientific and military interests at sea 
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are constructing bubbles of routine that secure against local voices, treating them as the 
dangerous external force of chaos and unpredictability.  
 
CONCLUSION  
A common theme pervades studies of maritime planning emanating from the social 
sciences. These studies find in zoning an architecture of governance that is ill-tuned to the 
materiality it seeks to secure, one unlikely to fulfil its ecological function. Designed for the 
production and harvest of marine life, rather than its conservation, studies point out that 
maritime spatial planning serves a commercial, rather than an environmental, purpose (Bear 
and Eden 2008). Moreover commentators have voiced suspicion about planning processes 
that exclude local coastal and fishing communities. Maritime spatial planning tends to 
standardise, or routinize, sea space. The dichotomy of Apollonian land and Dionysian sea is 
erased; certain procedures are installed that are common to both domains and a surveillance 
and monitoring regime is constructed. By being able to scientifically analyse, plan and 
predict the usage of space it acquires an economic worth. A hierarchy of value is constructed 
– some spaces are deemed to be more productive than other spaces and a market comes into 
being. Thus we are witnessing maritime borders, traffic corridors and multi-floored 
administrative enclaves reproducing a very modern formation. This structure is designed to 
manage vast three-dimensional, inhospitable environments through a network of secure 
routes connecting orderly, gentrified sites. The socio-technical imaginary at stake is a global 
network of secured zones that act as rational hubs of wealth creation and environmental 
management in the maritime sphere. Yet there is a distinct martial undertone in the 
blueprints of maritime spatial planning. It is increasingly tied to the production of national 
(and regional) maritime security strategies, for instance. Moreover, other accounts of zoning, 
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such as Cowen’s (2015) study of container port security, which is inextricably tied to 
maritime planning, demonstrate continuity with the commercial-military nexus that has 
historically animated the maritime sphere. Human and non-human life, as it flows through 
these multi-dimensional spheres, is not so much lived, as it is zoned, monitored and 
routinized. 
The phenomenologist’s preoccupation with space assists critical scholars of global politics in 
any bid to articulate alternatives forms of security. The reconfiguration of the sea – the 
political and economic redistribution being undertaken and the synchronous and incipient 
territorialisation – is producing new knowledge and policing technologies of governance 
that will inevitably be transferred between other ‘ungoverned’ open spaces. Wilderness 
areas such as deserts and mountains, intelligence blackspots and so-called failed states are 
ubiquitously described as sources of unpredictability, crime and ontological insecurity.  
Sloterdijk’s work on spheres provides us with insight into the rationality behind the security 
of complex space.. His genealogy traces the political theology of spatial security practices 
and connects it with the ambitions of globalization. We can find in his work an account of 
modernity’s will-to-zone, to equate security with social constructions of certainty and 
predictability. These zones are ‘bubbles’ of routine for Sloterdijk, miniature spheres of 
existence in which one feels immunized from the externalised world around. The article 
contrasted this Apollonian conceptualisation of security with Sloterdijk’s understanding of a 
secure space. Echoing and elaborating on the Dionysian materialism and localism of Gustav 
Bachelard, he seeks security in the sense of a home that is rooted in its surrounding 
environment. Rather than imposing a standardised design on fluid space, Sloterdijk calls for 
more open, relational spaces that allow their human and non-human inhabitants to thrive. 
The question thus arises how maritime spatial security doctrine can incorporate an 
inherently more inclusive and less anthropocentric imaginary of seaspace. This would seem 
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to imply spatial planning that seeks to radically localise maritime space rather than globalise 
it. Space, it is argued, is not a mechanistic object that can effectively be globally reproduced 
and distributed. Ultimately, it suggests adopting a view of space that is not constituted by 
biopolitical borders, hierarchies of access, exceptionality and market logic. The challenge 
therefore set by Bachelard and Sloterdijk is for maritime security to emerge around an 
organic, dynamic set of relationships constituted by human and nonhuman ways of life, 
memory, emotions and experience.  
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